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1. Introduction 
In August 2007, Russian holding company GIS acquired a French microelectronics 
manufacturer Altis Semiconductor from IBM and Infineon Technologies. In May 2008, Russian 
oil company Lukoil opened its first gas station in Belgium in one of Brussels’ neighbourhoods. 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev openly encourages Russian companies to internationalise 
by acquiring assets overseas and in the West in particular. 
Internationalisation of Russians companies, ranging from energy sector to mass media, 
unthinkable even a few years ago, has hit the headlines of leading newspapers. The names 
such as Lukoil, Rosneft and Gazprom became recognisable brands. While Russian itself is a 
lucrative growing market, Russian companies pursue an active policy of expansion abroad and 
seek to strengthen their market position on a global stage. Russia accounts for the largest FDI 
outflows relative to GDP among BRIC countries, yet Russian companies have been largely 
overshadowed by the emergence of Indian and Chinese multinationals and not sufficiently 
addressed, even neglected, in the literature. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to fill in 
some gaps in the literature regarding this research area. 
The mainstream research has focused on the amount of outward FDI and investment positions 
of home and host economies. FDI outflows from emerging economies have been often taken as 
a proxy of activities of emerging multinationals. Such approach can be challenged since the 
macro indicators conceal particular business motive and corporate strategies. Hence, the paper 
seeks to investigate what is behind the rising outward FDI from Russia. The idiosyncratic nature 
of Russian multinationals and specific way of their formation and development in the 1990s 
makes them an exciting object of academic research. 
The subject has been under-researched. There are several explanations to this problem. Firstly, 
Russian corporate invasion to abroad, and particularly, to Europe, caused concerns about the 
motives of their internationalisation, and contributed to creation of a wide-spread belief that they 
are tools of Russian foreign policy rather than economic agents. Secondly, Russian companies 
themselves are not prepared to disclose information about their activities and strategies, 
impeding further academic research. The complexity of this subject compels the author to adopt 
a multifaceted approach and a holistic view. The phenomenon of the emerging Russian 
multinationals is analysed through the prism and using insights from a number of subjects, 
namely transition studies, politics, innovation studies and international business studies. The 
aim is to identify and analyse the economic motives of Russian companies to internationalise, 
as well as their strategies and activities.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a general background by tracing 
the history of the emergence of Russian multinationals. Section 3 focuses on these companies, 
comparing them with BRICS counterparts and analysing their strategies and motivations. 
Section 4 looks at Europe as a destination for Russian investment. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
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2. Russian Capitalism: Politics and Business Intertwined  
 
2.1. Soviet Capitalism 
 
Strange as it may seem, several multinationals existed already in the times of the USSR. In his 
study of their operations in Germany, Austria, Sweden, Britain and Ireland, Geoffrey Hamilton 
(1986) refers to these companies as “red multinationals”. He observes “shallow” 
transnationalisation of these companies meaning that in most cases they carried out only 
marketing and sales operations. Moreover, all of them were state-owned by definition. Not 
surprisingly, he concludes that few of these enterprises showed signs of developing as Western 
multinationals had done. Similar argumentation was provided by McMillan (1987). In the same 
year, in his article “Soviet Capitalism: The Last Stage of Imperialism”, Guillén (1987) published a 
list of 72 Soviet multinationals with foreign investment holdings in 22 capitalist countries, arguing 
about internationalisation of Soviet enterprises. 
Understanding of the organisation of the Soviet economy can be helpful in explaining the 
motives of internationalisation, at least in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a 
contemporary loose grouping of former Soviet Republics. Most state-owned enterprises 
headquartered in Moscow had subsidiaries in various parts of the Soviet Union, i.e. in different 
Soviet republics. They all were termed “all-union enterprises”. When the Union was a single 
state and a common economic area, this fragmentation did not pose any problem, since it was 
coordinated by the Soviet Ministry for Central Planning. In fact, this fragmentation was 
intentionally created by policy-makers aiming at equal distribution of industrial objects across 
the Union. Furthermore, as the state promoted the “national champions” and competition was 
explicitly banned, most enterprises were assigned with specific suppliers and customer, i.e. the 
value chain was engineered by the government. Needless to say, suppliers and customers quite 
often were based in different Soviet Republics too. 
Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Eastern 
European equivalent of the European Economic Community) entailed disintegration of state-
owned enterprises whose assets now became located in sovereign and independent states 
(and even privatised according to national laws); and the links with suppliers and customers (as 
they become based in different states too, protected by tariff and non-tariff barriers) got broken. 
The only feasible way of re-establishing these links for corporate integration became the 
acquisition of these assets based abroad in CIS. Restructuring and transformation of these 
former state-owned enterprises, “red multinationals”, has been documented in several studies, 
including Filatotchev et al (2007), and King et al (1995) in the case of UK subsidiaries of these 
companies.  
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2.2. The 1990s: Russian Cowboy Capitalism 
 
Another group of Russian multinationals are those that emerged from the privatisation deals. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union heralded the demise of most state-owned Soviet multinational 
companies. As in all transition economies, the period of the 1990s was the time of massive 
privatisation in Russia. Unlike in the Central and Eastern European economies, the reliance on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia was minimal. While Russia witnessed the mass 
privatisation in the beginning of 1990s, it is widely-acknowledged that it did not create a class of 
effective owners. However, a class of owners, known as “oligarchs”, was swiftly formed in the 
mid-1990s in the process of distribution of state property among a handful of businessmen 
hand-picked by the ailing president Yeltsin and his entourage in “loans-for-shares” auctions. As 
a result, Mikhail Khodorkovsky obtained a 78 percent share of ownership in Yukos (worth $5bn) 
for only $310 mln, and Boris Berezovsky acquired oil company Sibneft (worth $3bn) for mere 
$100 mln (Goldman, 2004).  
These controversial deals within the “loans-for-shares” framework provided a ground for most 
emerging Russian multinationals and made their owners dazzlingly wealthy;  Vladimir Putin 
referred to them later as “appointed billionaires” (Aron, 2004). Hence, the 1990s can be roughly 
described as the time of the initial formation of large Russian companies and their restructuring 
and consolidation within the national economies. The outward FDI did exist but it can be 
regarded as “the capital flight” from the unstable environment to offshore paradises and tax 
heavens rather than firms’ internationalisation. The arrival of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin in 
2000 marked the end of the “oligarchs era” of the 1990s, or “cowboy capitalism”, as he termed it 
(BBC, 2004). 
 
2.3. The 2000s: Russia Goes Global 
 
As a result of “cowboy capitalism”, by 2000 the Russian economy had become largely 
concentrated in the hands of several corporations. In 2001 Troika Dialogue calculated that 
around 70 large financial and industrial groups control 40% of Russian GDP (Shekshina, 2001). 
While the “oligarchs” of the 1990s were mainly the owners of banks and other financial 
companies, the situation changed in the 2000s. Drastic rise in the prices of commodities (and 
specifically, oil and gas) has led to significant developments in the resource-based sectors and 
consequently to the growth of companies in these sectors. Most importantly, Russian 
companies (who have completed their restructuring on the domestic market) started venturing 
abroad. Whilst the motive of “the capital flight” still held, yet it can be argued that Russian 
companies started deliberately building their presence abroad. They started emerging as an 
important source of outward FDI. The annual average of outward FDI flows in the 1990s 
constituted around $1.6bn annually, and it has reached some $45.6bn in 2007. Similarly, 
outward FDI reached 16.8% of the gross fixed capital formation in 2007 against an average of 
3.0% in the 1990s.  
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Table 1 FDI inflows and outflows in/from Russian Federation 
Mln USD As a percentage of gross fixed capital 
formation 
 
1990-
2000 
(annual 
av.) 
2005 2006 2007 1990-
2000 
(annual 
av.) 
2005 2006 2007 
Inward flows 2 373 12 886 32 387 52 475 4.4 9.5 17.8 19.3 
Outward 
flows 
1 582 12 767 23 151 45 652 3.0 9.4 12.7 16.8 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2008 
 
Russia belongs to the group of emerging economies known as “BRIC”. In 2003 Jim O’Neill of 
Goldman Sachs coined a term “BRIC” to denote four economies with the strong economic 
growth: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. His recent forecast suggests that the aggregate GDP 
of these four countries will surpass the aggregate GDP of G7 by 2035. Furthermore, he argued 
later that Mexico could be added to this club making it “BRIMC”. And some other authors 
suggested using the term “BRICS” (BRIC + South Africa). A development going parallel to the 
growth of cumulative GDP of BRIC countries is the strong growth of outward FDI from these 
economies. 
 
Table 2 Stocks of outward FDI of BRICS economies (mln USD) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Russia 14 412 18 018 51 809 81 874 120 417 156 824 255 211
Brazil 11 041 53 227 54 646 64 363 71 556 87 049 129 840
China 27 579 35 538 37 006 38 825 46 311 73 330 95 799
South Africa 28 999 28 755 24 195 28 790 38 503 43 499 54 562
Mexico 11 992 12 425 13 815 15 885 28 040 35 144 44 703
India 2 068 2 499 5 054 6 592 9 569 12 964 29 412
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Reports of respective years 
The outward investments from BRICS economies and Russia in particular show impressive 
growth dynamics. Yet, these numbers should be interpreted with caution. In each volume of 
World Investment Report, UNCTAD warns about possible inaccurate calculations of FDI 
statistics by national statistics agencies. In the case of Russia, the drastic growth can be 
explained by improved methodology and data registration system used by the Russian statistics 
bureau, which started accounting for cumulative investments actually made in previous years. 
Nevertheless, even improvement of statistical data cannot explain the dramatic growth of 
outward FDI. It is rather clear that international activities of Russian companies have been 
booming in the recent years. 
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3. Russian Bears versus Chinese Dragons and Indian Elephants 
 
3.1. Russian Multinationals and their BRICS counterparts 
 
Since recently, companies from BRIC economies started emerging in the rankings of global 
companies. For examples, in the Forbes list of 2000 global companies, in 2007 there were 109 
Chinese (including Hong Kong), 48 Indian, 34 Brazilian, 17 South African and 16 Mexican 
companies. Russia was represented by 29 companies with the aggregate capitalisation of 
around $1 trillion (Annex 1). Similarly, BRIC companies are present in the Fortune 500 List 
(although without any single South African company). 
 
Table 3 BRIC companies in the Fortune 500 list 
2005 2006 2007  
Number Revenues
($ bn) 
Number  Revenues
($ bn) 
Number  Revenues
($ bn) 
Brazil 3 67.7 4 115.4 5 168.6 
Russia 3 86.5 5 157.7 4 176.0 
India 5 86.8 6 120.4 6 147.5 
China 16 464.5 20 617.4 24 838.5 
Mexico 2 78.2 5 146.8 5 172.6 
BRIMC 29 783.7 40 1 157.7 44 1 503.2 
USA 176 6 221.8 170 6 816.9 162 7 338.4 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Fortune 500 list 
Note: Fortune 500 includes Hong Kong-based companies in the list of Chinese firms 
 
The revenues of BRIMC companies doubled for the period 2005-2007, while the number 
increased only by 1.5. Similarly, the revenues of Russian companies doubled for the same 
period, with the number of companies staying basically the same. It should not be surprising 
given that all the companies in the list operate in the energy sector (Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosneft, 
Surgutneftegaz), and the price for energy resources has risen dramatically over the recent years. 
It fairly represents the Russian economy which is dominated by natural resources, metals and 
mining companies since 2000. Years of high oil/gas and commodity prices, as well as high 
demand from developed and emerging economies, have generated a windfall of export 
revenues, and made these companies cash-rich.  
In fact, being a large company (in terms of assets, sales, or profits) or having non-equity 
relations with foreign partners does not mean being a multinational company per se. In principle, 
a company may be uninational and generate all the revenues on the domestic market or by 
exporting its production abroad without any foreign presence (Kalotay, 2008). According to a 
conventional definition a company should be operating in at least two countries, or at least in 
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one country outside of the home one, to be called a multinational company. The Boston 
Consulting Group aimed to identify global companies from emerging economies based on both 
criteria – size and internationalisation. It compiled a list of 100 Global Challengers, based on 
both amount of revenues (over $1bn) and the degree of internationalisation (foreign subsidiaries, 
sales networks, etc). In the BCG’s (2008) list of 100 emerging multinationals, some 41 Chinese, 
20 Indian, 13 Brazilian, 7 Mexican and only 6 Russian companies can be found. Specifically in 
Russia, a survey of the Moscow School of Management Skolkovo and the Columbia Program 
on International Investment has identified 25 top multinationals. The criteria included foreign 
assets, foreign sales and foreign employment. 
Annex 2 presents an overview of appearance of Russian companies in all the four rankings – 
Skolkovo 25, BCG 100, Fortune 500 and Forbes 2000. Only two companies – energy giants 
Gazprom and Lukoil – appear in four rankings. Other companies are only in two lists or only in 
one of them. It entails that they might either too internationalised (but not large), or too large (but 
less internationalised). 
Orientation on the oil and gas and commodities is not the only similarity with other BRIC 
emerging multinationals. Companies servicing mass clients (electronics, telecommunications, 
retail, hardware) face with a challenge of serving low-income consumers. For example, in 
Russia companies start their operations with serving more affluent consumers in Moscow and 
St. Petersburg, regions with the highest income per capita. As the market saturates and the 
competitive pressure intensifies, companies are forced to explore markets in other regions, and 
adopt their strategies to serve low-income consumers. In a way, the situation is reminiscent of 
the concept of “bottom of the pyramid” put forward by Prahalad (2004) and Hart (2005). By 
going into the provincial regions and expanding their markets, emerging companies encounter 
problems of underdeveloped infrastructure and distribution networks in all BRICS economies. 
Exposed to all these challenges and having grown in unstable economic environment 
(economic crises in the 1990s) made these companies resilient to shocks and flexible in a way. 
 
3.2. Theory of Firm Internationalisation and Emerging Multinationals 
 
The theory has provided tools for the analysis of internationalisation of firms. The classical 
framework for the explanation of firm internationalisation is the OLI paradigm developed by 
Dunning (1977, 1988). According to OLI paradigm, in order to invest in another country a firm 
has to satisfy three conditions. Firstly, a firm should possess Ownership advantages, i.e. should 
possess a technology or product that could compete on a domestic market. Secondly, there 
should be a reason to invest overseas rather than staying on the domestic market, meaning 
Location advantages. And lastly, investing overseas (and producing there) should be more 
profitable for a firm rather than exporting goods produced domestically, i.e. Internationalisation 
advantages. 
Another theory, the product life cycle by Vernon (1966, 1979) addresses corporate strategies of 
multinational companies operating in developed and developing countries. An innovating 
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company in the developed economy starts producing a new innovative product for the home 
market. Over time, as the product matures and production processes become standardised, its 
exports (to developing countries) increase, and eventually a company sets up manufacturing in 
its larger foreign markets. 
Overall, the internationalisation theory has been the object of long and extensive treatment in 
the literature, e.g. Williamson (1975), Buckley and Casson (1976) and others. A significant 
contribution to this strand of literature was made by Johanson and Vahlne (1977), widely known 
as Uppsala Model. This is a model of incremental internationalisation overcoming “psychic 
distance”. In other words, firms start their internationalisation from neighbouring markets with 
low market commitment, and proceed from no regular export activities to the foreign production 
units, and later expand to more remote markets1.  
While the theory of firm internationalisation has been built to explain the motivations and 
strategies of firms from developed countries (expanding to developing markets), there have 
been several attempts to test the applicability of these theories to explain internationalisation of 
BRIC companies. Outward FDI and multinationals from emerging economies were investigated 
in the early pioneering studies of Heenan and Keegan (1979), Lall (1983) and Wells (1983). 
Another strand of theory (development studies) has focused on the impact of inward FDI from 
developed economies on developing ones; and the intensification of FDI flows from developing 
economies to developed ones called upon rethinking of prevalent concepts of development 
studies. The relationships between the structure and level of development of the economy of a 
nation and the nature of outward as well as inward FDI have been formalised by Dunning (1981, 
1988) in his seminal work on the investment development path (IDP); its updated version was 
published in 1998 (Dunning and Narula, 1998). This model holds that outward FDI is a function 
of the development level of the country (GDP per capita). Regarding multinationals from 
emerging economies, the investment development path suggests that they tend to initially invest 
in resource- and market-seeking activities in neighbouring countries and then expand their 
presence worldwide. In a way, these provisions of IDP are similar with the tenets of 
aforementioned Uppsala Model. 
A series of publications has been devoted to the topic of emerging multinationals, including 
(2005), Globerman and Shapiro (2006), Goldstein and Shaw (2007), Benito and Narula (2007). 
Besides, international organisations have also paid considerable attention to the 
internationalisation of firms from emerging economies. In 2006 both OECD and UNCTAD 
published reports dedicated to emerging multinationals (UNCTAD, 2006; OECD, 2006). 
Despite the interest and novelty of the topic of emerging multinationals, the focus of most 
studies has been on the Asian and Latin American multinationals, overlooking their Russian 
counterparts. Despite a group of studies (Bulatov, 2001; Crane et al., 2005; Heinrich, 2003; 
Kalotay, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008; Kets de Vries et al., 2004; Vahtra and Liuhto, 2006) the 
research on Russian multinationals remains scarce. In his painstaking research on the 
                                                
1 Kalotay (2008) shows that Uppsala model can actually explain behaviour of Russian resource-based companies. 
First, they start internationalisation through export of products, at a later stage they acquire foreign assets and 
establish subsidiaries due to a variety of reasons (e.g. to avoid export duties). 
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applicability of conceptual models to explaining internationalisation of Russian companies, 
Kalotay (2008) concludes that Dunning’s eclectic paradigm could be applied to Russian 
multinationals, although with some extension on home country basis. Yet, other theories would 
require more re-thinking for explanation of this phenomenon. This brief overview of theoretical 
foundations is helpful for further analysis, yet contribution to theory-building is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
 
3.3. Motives of Internationalisation of Russian companies 
 
In order to investigate motivation of Russian companies to expand overseas, I use of the 
conventional classification of FDI motives put forward by Dunning (1993). Relevance of each of 
the four types of FDI is considered for the Russian multinationals. Despite seemingly clear-cut 
division between four types of FDI, however, it should be kept in mind that in many cases 
multinationals pursue several goals with the same acquisition, and hence FDI may have several 
motives at the same time. 
Firstly, resource-seeking motive refers to investment seeking to acquire factors of production or 
natural resources. Russian corporate expansion to the CIS can be to a large extent explained 
by the resource-seeking motives. Examples include Russian oil company Lukoil’s operations in 
oil-rich Azerbaijan and Russian miner and steel maker Mechel’s operations in Kazakhstan with 
the goal of securing access to valuable raw materials used in steel making. 
Secondly, market-seeking motive refers to investments which aim at either entering new 
markets or maintaining existing ones. In the manner consistent with the tenets of the Uppsala 
Model and Investment Development Path, Russian multinationals have been expanding their 
geographical presence in the neighbouring markets of the CIS. Examples include expansion of 
the electronics retailer chain Euroset, and telecommunications companies MTS and Vimpelcom 
to the CIS markets. Russian companies benefit from the knowledge of local traditions and 
business practices as well as sharing common language. As for the advanced developed 
markets, Russian companies seemingly face challenges entering them, having to deal with 
tough competition (from both traditional and emerging multinationals) and regulatory 
impediments. Yet, these attempts may be successful. For example, Lukoil undertook 
downstream investments in the US, Western and Eastern Europe. By accessing the end 
customers, resource-based companies aim to widen their profit margin, which remain limited as 
they sell raw materials at the low end of the product value chain. 
Thirdly, efficiency-seeking investment has as its goal to increase a firm’s efficiency by exploiting 
the benefits of economies of scale and scope, or common ownership. Dunning (1993) suggests 
that efficiency-seeking FDI would come sequentially after the two previously discussed type of 
FDI. In a Russian case, efficiency-seeking outward FDI is mostly evidenced by the corporate 
consolidation of assets located in CIS countries and Eastern Europe. Examples include 
acquisition of refining assets in Odessa (Ukraine) by Lukoil, acquisition of the Linos oil refinery 
in the Lugansk region (Ukraine) by TNK-BP in 2000; purchase of Aluminium Foil Plant in 
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Armenia by Rusal. And more recently, in February 2006, Russian Severstal acquired a 60 
percent stake in the Ukrainian metal producer Dneprometiz, the biggest producer of hardware 
products in Ukraine. 
With the growing importance of the technology, innovation and know-how for the 
competitiveness of a modern company, there is a trend to focus on acquisition of technology- 
and R&D-intensive units (both companies and research institutes) as a form of asset-seeking 
FDI. Russian companies have a great interest in the advanced technologies, marketing 
experience and modern managerial skills. Yet, asset-seeking FDI to obtain a technological edge 
appears to be rare.  
Russian multinational group Renova appears to be an exception from this rule. Recently, it was 
engaged in acquisition of two technology-intensive Swiss companies. In 2006, Renova bought 
10.25% in Oerlikon Corp., and in 2008 it became its principle shareholder. Renova will help 
Oerlikon establish production of equipment for car components in Russia, and its turn, 
Oerlikon’s technologies may be applied on Ural turbine plant, subsidiary of Renova (Integrum, 
2008). In 2007, Renova also acquired a considerable stake in Sulzer AG, a producer of 
equipment for oil, gas, chemical, pulp-and-paper and other industries. 
In order to understand the internationalisation strategies of Russian companies, these four 
classical “pull” motives of foreign investment can be complemented with the “push” factors. One 
of these “push” factors would obviously be a “system escape” motivation (Bulatov, 1998). In the 
late-1990s Russian companies sought to diversify from Russian market to foreign markets in 
order to escape economic volatility and political instability. While currently the Russian market 
shows the signs of economic stability for many years consecutively, many Russian companies 
still seek to venture abroad to hedge themselves against any potential political risks. 
Another “push” factor is the underdeveloped financial sector in Russia. Skyrocketing oil and gas 
and commodities prices generate windfall of revenues, yet they boost the ambitions for further 
corporate growth and expansion. Russian financial system is still immature and cannot provide 
necessary financial resources, hence most Russian giants are unable to lend on the internal 
market. For example, in the Russian giant Gazprom faced problems when it decided to acquire 
the controlling stake of 72.663% in the oil company Sibneft. It had to raise $13.09bn, which was 
virtually impossible in the domestic Russian financial system; and the loan was provided by a 
syndicate of western banks that included Morgan Stanley, ABN AMRO and Dresdner Kleinwort 
Wasserstein. Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft conducted its IPO (49% of shares) in 
London in 2006. Moreover, exchange rate appreciations and high interest rates at home speak 
in favour of access to capital in the West too. 
 
3.4. Greenfield, Mergers & Acquisitions and Strategic Alliances 
 
Traditionally, firm internationalisation implies two form of entering a host economy – acquisition 
of a domestic firm or establishment of a new subsidiary in a greenfield project. A more recent 
trend in internationalisation is establishment of strategic alliances with partners from a target 
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market. Formation of a strategic alliance has its own advantage and disadvantages compare to 
the traditional modes of internationalisation. 
In the case of Russian companies, while most of the attention has been drawn to their 
acquisition of foreign assets, in fact they have been quite active in establishing greenfield 
projects, and their number even exceeded that of M&A deals (Table 4). Moreover, strategic 
alliances are popular among Russian companies; this number has fluctuated since 2000, but it 
has been steadily growing since 2004 (after a temporary decrease). Overall, all three modes of 
internationalisation (M&A deals, greenfield projects and strategic alliances) have been on the 
increase. 
 
Table 4 Number of M&A deals, greenfield projects and strategic alliances initiated by Russian 
companies 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
M&A deals 30 46 54 76 54 61 121 140 
Greenfield projects   51 120 109 139 156 … 
Strategic alliances 29 21 51 28 15 37 52 89 
Source: UNCTAD WIR 2007, based on information from OCO Consulting, LOCOmonitor (for greenfield 
projects); Thomson SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions / Joint Ventures & Alliances (for M&A deals 
and strategic alliances). Note: only strategic alliances with foreign partners are included, agreements 
between companies and governments are excluded. 
While comparison between the three modes is interesting per se, I take a deeper look at the 
geographical distribution of M&A deals, and later – strategic alliances. The number of deals is 
used, rather than the value of transaction. The main reason is that the value of transaction is 
available only for certain M&A deals. Moreover, as I seek to show the magnitude of M&A activity 
rather than absolute amount in financial terms, the number of deals seems to be a more 
appropriate measure. 
Table 5 Number of M&A deals performed by Russian companies 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Russia 279 290 249 329 219 253 332 476 
CIS 17 19 20 40 25 20 29 35 
Eastern Europe 6 6 17 17 10 11 12 20 
Western Europe 5 18 8 13 8 19 51 53 
Northern America 1 2 5 2 5 - 11 10 
Asia   2 1 2 3 5 10 
Middle East 1 1 1 2 2 5 4 6 
Africa   1 1 1 1 6 1 
Latin America      1 1  
Australia     1  2  
Rest of the world      1  5 
Total 309 336 303 405 273 314 453 616 
Source: calculated from the data of Thomson SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions / Joint Ventures & 
Alliances. Note: Rest of the world – British Virgin Islands in 2005 and 2007, Turks and Caicos Islands in 
2007, Jersey in 2007 
The data in the Table 5 reveal several interesting trends. Firstly, Russian companies have been 
increasingly active in M&A activity, almost doubling the number of deals in 2007 in comparison 
to 2000. Secondly, M&A deals with other Russian companies account for the lion’s share of all 
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M&A activity of Russian companies. The CIS economies were the main target of Russian 
multinationals at the beginning of the 2000s. The rate of acquisition remained practically the 
same throughout the entire period 20-40 M&A deals per annum. Since the mid-2000s we are 
witnessing interest of Russian multinationals towards assets in Europe (Western Europe in 
particular) and Northern America. 
In the case of strategic alliances, the situation is somewhat different. To start with, the number 
of alliance partners in Russia is rather small. It might imply that companies operate in their 
habitual environment on the Russian market and they may obtain a full control over its target 
through a variety of market and non-market mechanisms. Moreover, lack of trust among 
economic agents on the market inhibits formation of strategic alliances. Similar reasons explain 
why this number is so low in CIS countries and Eastern Europe too. On the other hand, when 
entering sophisticated markets of Western Europe and Northern America as well as Asian 
countries, Russian companies tend to rely on strategic alliances as an alliance partner facilitates 
entry into foreign market. Moreover, Russian companies seek to obtain access to the latest 
technologies through a strategic alliance. 
 
Table 6 Strategic alliances of Russian companies  
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total number of 
alliances 
50 33 88 48 25 55 81 152 
Russia 6 6 14 6 2 6 11 29 
Western Europe 14 8 35 16 15 20 23 60 
North America 11 6 14 12 7 6 20 19 
CIS 7 8 12 6 1 4 5 12 
Asia 7 8 17 3 1 9 17 31 
Eastern Europe 2  2 2  3 1 6 
Middle East    1 1 2  2 
Africa 1 1 3    2 2 
Latin America   2   2  1 
Australia 2  1 1  1 1 1 
Unknown    1 1 3 2 4 
RoW (e.g. 
Guernsey) 
      1 1 
Source: Thomson SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions / Joint Ventures & Alliances. 
Notes:  The year of announcement and alliance partner, total number and number of alliance partners, 
excluding a Russian company in each alliance. If there are 3 partners in alliance, they are counted 
separately (as if Russian company formed an alliance with each partner separately), hence the number of 
alliance partner is not equal to the number of alliances. The immediate partner is counted as an alliance 
partner, not the ultimate owner. 
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3.5. Geography of Internationalisation 
 
Modern Russian multinationals are re-tracing the steps of former Soviet “red multinationals”, 
from former Soviet republics to Africa, Asia and Latin America. In accordance with Uppsala 
Model and Investment Development Path, Russian multinationals started their 
internationalisation process from the neighbouring CIS countries. The process is facilitated by 
linkages established in the Soviet times, common business practices and relatively low interest 
to these economies from the part of well-established multinationals and Western investors. 
Russian energy companies are particularly interested in these markets. For instance, Russian 
electricity giant RAO UES has acquired power station and energy-distribution in Armenia, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The prospects of economic growth in CIS countries offer even 
more investment opportunities in the future. This is why not only companies working in 
resource-intensive sectors, but also those in retail and consumer-oriented sectors enter CIS 
economies. For example, Russian biggest bank Sberbank offers its services to clients in 
Kazakhstan. 
Moreover, in some cases Russian companies may use CIS countries as a testing ground for 
new innovative products or services before they are offered on a wide-scale in the home country. 
For example, in April 2006 a Belarusian subsidiary of a Russian telecommunications company 
MTS (part of the Sistema JSFC), in partnership with Siemens, launched a trial area of 3G 
communication network in the capital Minsk (Siemens, 2006). As the trial proved to be 
successful, MTS announced the launch of 3G in its home market Russia in the second half of 
2008, or early 2009 (in partnership with Ericsson) (CNews, 2008). Similarly, with its launch in 
Ukraine in 2007, MTS became the first operator in the CIS region to offer Blackberry enterprise 
services to its subscribers. MTS intends to launch similar services back in Russia in 2008 (MTS, 
2008). Over time Russian multinationals have extended their geographical reach and 
established commercial presence in Europe, which is now the main destination of Russian 
outward investment (Table 7).  
 
Table 7 Foreign assets and foreign subsidiaries of top 25 Russian multinationals, 2006 
 Number of foreign 
subsidiaries 
Percentage of 
assets 
Western Europe 52 
Eastern Europe 
271 
11 
CIS 119 22 
Northern America 42 6 
Asia and Australia 25 3 
Africa 11 4 
Latin America 6 2 
Offshores 156  
Source: Skolkovo (2007) 
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In the Eastern European markets Russian companies enjoy familiarity with the local conditions, 
yet it often sparks political sensitivities given the uneasy common past. As an example, the 
acquisition of the ailing Vítkovice Steelworks in Czech Republic by Evraz Group in 2005 was 
complicated. The situation is somewhat paradoxical. It is quite logical that Russian companies 
start internationalisation with the expansion to the nearest regions, such as CIS and Central and 
Eastern Europe. Yet, the very same countries are wary of Russian economic presence 
regarding it through the prism of the economic dependency. Besides, new EU member states 
seek to deliver this message to the entire union.  
As for Western Europe, although the political sentiments are not as strong as in Eastern Europe, 
in the West Russian companies faces with different managerial practices. They are requested to 
reveal their shareholders’ structure and introduce more transparency in their operations. For 
many Russian companies born in the period of “cowboy capitalism” and extensively using the 
scheme of acquisition through offshore companies, these requirements are quite demanding 
and challenging. According to Skolkovo (2007), top 25 Russian multinationals have 156 offshore 
subsidiaries (comparing to 474 subsidiaries worldwide, or the same number as the aggregate 
number of subsidiaries in CIS, Asia and Africa). 
A good example of a successful deal in Western Europe is the acquisition of Danish steel 
manufacturer DanSteel A/S by Novolipetsk Steel. The Russian company has been in a long-
standing partnership with DanSteel, being its major supplier of quality steel slabs since 2002. In 
January 2006 Novolipetsk Steel acquired a 100% stake in DanSteel A/S. The Danish plant 
receives its raw materials from Novolipetsk Steel in Lipetsk every week and produces structural 
steel, shipbuilding steel and steel for boilers and pressure vessels (NLMK, 2008). 
Russian multinationals are considering and increasing their presence in locations in the 
Northern America, Australia and Africa. Since the most Russian multinationals operate in the 
resource-based sectors, their orientation of Africa, rich in mineral resources, is unsurprising. For 
example, Alrosa, Russia’s largest diamond company is involved in three projects in Angola 
(Alrosa, 2008). Norilsk Nickel is engaged in two nickel mining projects in Botswana and South 
Africa (NorilskNickel, 2008). Russian companies in non-source sectors are moving to Africa as 
well. In September 2006, a joint Russian-Angolan bank Banco VTB Africa SA opened in 
Angolan capital Luanda (VTB owns 66% of shares in this establishment). VTB had already had 
its presence in Namibia before (VTB, 2008). 
Moreover, “no go” countries (such as Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria) had strong ties with the 
former USSR, and they are open for Russian investments. Lukoil was active in Iraq before the 
US-led invasion. In Iran, Gazprom is engaged in exploration of the South Pars field project 
executed by the consortium comprised of Total, Petronas and Gazprom (Gazprom, 2008). More 
recently, in April 2008, Gazprom signed a deal with the National Oil Corporation of Libya to set 
up a joint venture (RIAN, 2008). Russia can still leverage its former close relations and 
knowledge of these countries to its advantage and advantage of Russian multinationals. 
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3.6. Corporate R&D of Russian multinationals 
 
Innovation and R&D are undoubtedly recognised as the ultimate source of corporate 
competitiveness in the contemporary world. Furthermore, multinational companies are creators 
and bearers of innovation and ideas across borders (Romer, 2003; Sanna-Randaccio and 
Veugelers, 2003). Emerging multinational companies start realising the importance of 
investment in R&D, viewing it as a necessary condition for the long-term sustainability. It finds 
its reflection in the R&D Scoreboard of the top 850 UK and 1250 global companies by R&D 
investment, published annually by the UK Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory 
Reform (formerly Depratment of Trade and Industry). It has become the core reference for 
benchmarking R&D investment data.  
Judging by the sheer number of companies in the list, the performance of BRICS is rather 
modest, with the total number of 21 company out of 1250 (and without any South African or 
Mexican company). China (incl. Hong Kong) has the biggest number of companies – 10, while 
Russia is represented only by Gazprom. BRIC companies appeared in the R&D Scoreboard list 
for the first time in 2001, and since then they started strengthening their presence. 
Retrospective analysis reveals increase in the number of R&D top performers among Chinese 
and Indian companies, while the number of Brazilian and Russian companies remains roughly 
the same. In fact, it even decreased for Russia: in 2006 and 2007 it is represented only by 
Gazprom, while in 2005 a national car maker AvtoVAZ was also present. 
 
Table 8 Investments of BRIC companies in R&D (£mln) 
Report Publication 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Year of analysis 2000 2001 2002 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006 
Total number of firms in 
Scoreboard 
 
500 
 
600 
 
700 
 
700 
 
1000 
 
1250 
 
1250 
China  1 2 3 6 9 10 
India   1  1 3 7 
Brazil 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 
Russia     2 1 1 
South Africa   1 1 1 1  
Total R&D investment of 
companies in 
Scoreboard 
 
193 351 
 
206 466 
 
206 719
 
204 579
 
219 723 
 
249 355 
 
243 944
China  108.44 151.15 311.4 513.16 838.63 945.73 
India   238.00  48.64 155.08 268.17 
Brazil  90.39 91.14 91.31 209.05 238.64 448.02 674.81 
Russia     82.17 132.63 254.70 
South Africa   74.06 55.99 36.52 20.85  
Note: Numbers for China calculated as a sum of China (proper) and Hong Kong 
Source: BERR (2008), and annual R&D Scoreboards by UK DTI 
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The numbers for BRIC are still only a tiny share of the global R&D spendings. However, it 
should be kept in mind that the cost of R&D (primarily, the workforce wage) is lower in emerging 
economies than in developed countries. Moreover, depsite this modest performance in terms of 
number of companies, BRIC multinationals are catching up. While annual growth of 1250 global 
R&D performers constituted 9%, Chinese and Indian multinationals showed 30% growth, 
Brazilian multinationals – 71.7% and Russian ones (Gazprom) virtually doubled its R&D 
investment. Similarly, measuring in the long-term perspective (4 years), the rates of growth have 
been impressive – from 25.8% in China to 220.0% in Russia, whilst the average growth of 
G1250 companies was only 5.5%. Other indicators also speak in favours of BRIC, but the 
analysis here is more complex taking into consideration industry-specific features. For example, 
Indian multinationals as a group invested 27.4% of operating profit into R&D, while Russian 
Gazprom – only 1.6%. The explanation comes from the fact that many Indian multinationals 
operate in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, where this ratio by definition is extremely high 
due to high costs of developing new drugs and molecules. 
 
Table 9 Emerging multinationals in the Global 1250 R&D 2007 Scoreboard  
 
 Numbe
r of 
compa
nies in 
Scoreb
oard 
R&D 
investm
ent 
2006/07
, £m 
Growth 
over last 
year %  
Growth 
over 
average 
of last 4 
years % 
As % of 
operatin
g profit 
As % of 
sales 
R&D 
investm
ent plus 
capital 
expendit
ures as 
% of 
sales 
Industrie
s 
China 7 765.66 32.3 25.8 3.2 0.6 9.9 1, 4, 7, 8 
Hong Kong 3 180.07 12.6 110.9 65.8 1.9 3.1 3, 4 
Brazil 3 674.81 71.7 147.6 4.9 1.4 21.4 1, 2, 6 
India 7 268.17 30.6 50.8 27.4 3.8 12.6 5, 8, 9 
Russia 1 254.70 101.0 220.0 1.6 0.6 20.7 1 
World 1250 20 927.
5 
9.0 5.5 13.4 1.8 8.2  
Source: BERR (2008) 
Notes on industries: 1 – oil & gas producers; 2 – mining; 3 - electronic & electrical equipment; 4 - 
technology hardware & equipment; 5 - automobiles & parts; 6 - aerospace & defence; 7 - fixed line 
telecommunications; 8 - software & computer services; 9 - pharmaceuticals & biotechnology  
 
Gazprom, which occupies the 172th place in the ranking, is performing relatively well in 
comparison to other oil and gas producers in the G1250 list. It invests 1.6 % of operating profit 
into R&D, the same number as average for 18 companies, and even higher in terms of R&D 
investment as percentage of sales – 0.6 against 0.3% on average. As it has already been said, 
Gazprom almost doubled its R&D investment over the last year comparing only to 20% increase 
on average among global oil and gas producers. 
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The fact that Russian multinationals appeared in the Scoreboard only in mid-2000s is reflects 
the state-of-affairs in the Russian economy in the period of the 1990s, investment in R&D was 
not among the priorities of Russian companies. The main goals were acquisition of state assets 
in controversial deals, struggle for a market share, corporate restructuring and consolidation. In 
most cases profits were divided among few shareholders or landed into affiliated companies in 
offshore paradises. Investment in R&D did not generate immediate profits and therefore were 
considered uneconomical. Moreover, many emerging Russian companies are in low R&D-
intensive oil and gas sector, where R&D investment on average account for 1.6% of operating 
profit comparing to almost 20% in pharmaceuticals (BERR, 2008).  
Russian companies have used various approaches to organise their corporate R&D. The most 
widely used (and the most economical) on was the acquisition of state-owned research 
institutes2. Most Russian emerging multinationals were formed as a result of privatisation of 
state assets in the 1990s. In the similar way, many former state-owned research institutes that 
used to be part of Ministries or Academy of Sciences were privatised and got integrated in these 
companies, or vice versa – became part of these companies that got privatised later3.  
The R&D department of Norilsk Nickel is a research institute “Gipronickel”, located in 
St. Petersburg. This research institutes was established in 1934 within the Ministry of Industry of 
USSR. Since 1990 it is part of the State Concern “Norilsk Nickel”; in April 1994 the Concern 
became a joint-stock company, and all enterprises within the Concern (including “Gipronickel”), 
became its daughter companies. In 2007 other Russian research institutes joined “Gipronickel”, 
making it a hub of the corporate R&D for Norilsk Nickel. Now, “Gipronickel” is the major 
metallurgic R&D institute in Russia (Gipronickel, 2008).  
Gazprom has its own research institute VNIIGAZ that provides scientific and technological 
solutions to research, development and project issues, with the main purpose is to find and 
make use of new oil/gas wells. The research institute was established in 1948. In 1999 the 
institute was reorganised in a limited liability company, with Gazprom possessing 100% shares. 
Currently, VNIIGAZ is a network of research centres, divisions and laboratories. VNIIGAZ 
cooperates with foreign multinationals and research institutes from US, UK, Norway, France, 
Italy, Germany, Hungary, Japan, China, Argentina, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan 
(Vniigaz, 2008). 
Rosneft is not an exception in the way its R&D is structured. In order to achieve the integration 
of corporate research, Rosneft has created a corporate scientific and production complex, which 
unites four oil and gas scientific research institutes in different Russian regions. The 
geographical location of these four institutes enables the company to cover all the regions in 
                                                
2 In the centrally planned economic system, the organisational structure for research, development and innovation 
was highly fragmented. There was a traditional separation between a network of branch R&D, project design and 
product design organisation on one side, and a network of enterprises on the other (Hanson and Pavitt, 1987). 
With the collapse of the central planning system, these research institutes remained without customers as many 
state-owned enterprises closed down or drastically reduced demand in the results of R&D. 
3 Likewise, western multinationals acquired research institutes in transition economies in the 1990s (see 
Filippov and Costa, 2008 for life sciences in Czech Republic) 
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Russia where it operates. These four institutes are former state-owned research institutes which 
were privatised in the 1990s (Rosneft, 2008). 
As resources get depleted in the traditional oil- and gas-bearing provinces and new resources 
are remote and increasingly difficult to produce, and major part of equipment became obsolete, 
many oil and gas corporations realised that advanced technology is a main driver of corporate 
profitability. Yet, after a decade of neglect of fundamental and applied research, many state-
owned research institutes (many of whom are now corporate R&D centres) have lost its 
expertise. Moreover, a frontier in many sciences, such as life sciences, has moved radically, 
making it virtually impossible to catch-up; and hence making development of internal research 
capabilities a futile undertaking. Therefore, access to foreign technology has been perceived as 
a reasonable way to boost the productivity and increase profitability. 
Generally speaking, as any other company, Russian multinationals may choose to source 
technology in two different ways; firstly, by forming a strategic alliance with a Western firm, and 
secondly, by acquiring a technology-intensive western company. Obviously, there is a multitude 
of opportunities in between these extremes. In case of oil and gas companies, they may also 
sign profit-sharing agreement with a western multinational for development of specific oil fields. 
In the 1990s, several production sharing agreements (PSA) were concluded, which involved 
participation of Exxon (US), SODECO (Japan), Shell (UK/the Netherlands),  Marathon (US), 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi (Japan), Mobil, Texaco, Exxon (US) ARCO (US) British Petroleum (UK), 
TotalFinaElf (France), NorskHydro (Norway) Conoco (US), etc. 
In terms of forming strategic alliances, oil company Yukos has been an unrivalled leader, as it 
opted for strategic alliances as the main source of technology acquisitions and efficiency 
improvement. In 1998 Yukos formed strategic alliance with the multinational Schlumberger and 
started implementing QHSE (Quality, Health, Safety, Environment) management at all sites. It 
was argued that Schlumberger’s expertise helped Yukos increase production rates at certain oil 
wells 30% to 200% (Alexander’s Gas and Oil, 2001). In July 2000, Yukos signed a contract with 
Norwegian engineering firm Kvaerner for development of surface infrastructure at west Siberian 
Priobskoye field. Besides, Yukos had a strategic alliance with TotalFinaElf covering the Shatsky 
block in the Black Sea. Partnering with western companies had as its goal to improve the ratio 
of developed to under-developed oil reserves.  
Henderson and Radosevic (2004) compared the use of alliances by Lukoil and Yukos to access 
the technology. They argue that for Yukos alliances have been central to improved operational 
efficiency and growth of the company, while for Lukoil alliances have been peripheral to its 
performance (resulting to worse financial and operational results of the company). One of the 
alliances that Lukoil formed has been the one with the US giant Conoco Philips. Both 
companies went even further, and in 2004 Conoco Philips acquired 7.6% stake in Lukoil, later it 
increased it to 20%. As a result, Lukoil got access to the latest technologies and capital, and 
Conoco Philips secured access to Lukoil’s oil and gas reserves in Russia. 
For Russian telecommunications companies such as MTS and VimpelCom foreign expertise in 
the telecommunications sector became indispensable, and they chose alliance and partnerships 
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with foreign companies, technological leaders, as a way to access the latest technologies. They 
could not integrate any former state-owned research institutes as the companies operating in 
resource-intensive sectors. Both telecommunications companies were created from scratch 
rather than established in the process of privatisation, and they didn’t inherit any research 
institutes. Moreover, Russian research institutes didn’t possess competence in the new 
telecommunications technologies rapidly developing in the West. Acquisition of a Western 
company was also troublesome (as the number of such companies on the market is limited). 
Both MTS and VimpelCom entered in partnerships with Ericsson and other leading technology 
companies (Ericsson, 2004a, 2004b). 
In terms of foreign acquisitions, a good example is a deal between Russian multinational Basic 
Element and Magna International (Canada), second largest auto parts maker in North America, 
in May 2007. Basic Element invested $1.54bn into the Canadian international. The Russian 
company aims to get access to the advanced Western technologies, and Magna, in its turn, 
secures local partner in the fast-growing auto markets. 
 
3.7. State Policy on Outward Investment: “Copy China” 
 
Acquisition of foreign assets by Russian multinationals has raised concerns in developed 
markets. Many believe that Russian multinationals (whose capital is allegedly directly or 
indirectly controlled by the Russian government) are seeking not the access to technology, 
capital or market, but rather act as tools of Russian foreign policy seeking to project Kremlin’s 
power on a number of countries. 
While majority state-owned company like Gazprom and Rosneft are by definition closely-linked 
to the Kremlin, others active in overseas M&A (Lukoil, Rusal, Severstal) might be indirectly 
related to the Kremlin. On top of that, there are no indications that smaller companies operating 
in non-energy sectors (telecommunications firms MTS and Vimplecom or food producer Wimm-
Bill-Dann) may be controlled by the state. Apparently, for them the profit maximisation emerges 
as the main motive for internationalisation. 
Generally speaking, a government can promote outward FDI and exports through a variety of 
economic and financial measures such as tax rebates. A state can also conduct “economic 
diplomacy” to promote the interests of their companies overseas. Seemingly, unlike the Chinese 
“going global” programme, supporting attempts of national champions to internationalise by 
implementing an investment-friendly framework (Sauvant, 2005), Russian Federation has never 
had any specific policy to promote outward FDI (Kalotay, 2008). At least this policy has not been 
explicitly formulated and/or openly conducted.  
Things are starting changing, however. Dmitry Medvedev, the new Russian President, made a 
speech in January 2008 (while still in the capacity of Deputy Prime Minister) to influential 
Russian big businesses. In the speech he appealed to Russian companies to “copy China” by 
expanding overseas and going on a global buying spree of foreign assets. "This is a very 
important task. The majority of powerful countries are engaged in this. Many of them are very 
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active, like China. And we should be active, too” (FT, 2008). Mr Medvedev underscored that 
expanding Russian presence overseas would be beneficial for the Russian economy and cut its 
dependence on foreign technology. A global expansion drive would "allow us to retool Russian 
enterprises with technology, boost their production culture and grant them the opportunity to 
diversify investments and win new markets" (FT, 2008). 
He pledged Government’s support at home and abroad to expanding Russian companies 
acquiring assets overseas, specifically, competitive energy and high-tech industries. Despite the 
declaration of strategic support, Russian government has not yet developed a consistent policy 
of assisting Russian multinationals in the global expansion. However, it is often speculated that 
Russian government provides implicit policy support. 
 
4. EU-Russia Relations and Russian Multinationals 
 
4.1. Russia’s Companies in Europe 
 
According to Skolkovo (2007), at the end of 2006, 63% of the foreign subsidiaries of Russian 
multinationals concentrated in Europe. Yet, Russian investment into EU member states reaches 
only €3bn, while the EU investments to Russian economy amount to €30bn, while (CBR, 2008). 
More specifically, Russians target Eastern Europe for a variety of reasons, ranging from 
psychological ones (similar mentality and shared past) to pragmatic ones (opportunities of 
growing markets and access to the single European market).  
For example, Russian metallurgical company Mechel has a network of subsidiaries in Europe, 
specifically, in Romania and Lithuania. Mechel Nemunas in Lithuanian Kaunas is a metallurgical 
plant specialising in hardware manufacturing, majority of whose output is sold to consumers in 
the EU (Mechel, 2008). It may be argued that Lithuanian membership was essential in the 
decision to acquire Nemunas, as the company obtained control over the assets in October 2003, 
in the wake of EU enlargement. The situation is similar with the Romanian case. Russia and EU 
have an export quota system in place whereby Russian exports to the EU are limited to certain 
stipulated quantities for each product category. Besides, Russian industrial technologies may 
not be able to comply with these raised environmental standards and such non-compliance may 
become an additional basis for restricting Russian steel exports to the European market. 
Production within the EU borders enables to effectively avoid these restrictions on the export of 
products to the EU member states. 
Gazprom is actively in the Baltic region too. In January 2004, Gazprom finalised its acquisition 
of a 34% stake in Lietuvos Dujos, Lithuania’s natural gas company; and before that it had 
already held stakes in the energy companies in Latvia (25% stake in Latvian Gaze) and Estonia 
(37% stake in Eesti Gaas). (EIA, 2004). Once again, the 2004 EU enlargement could serve as a 
motivation, as Gazprom could consider Baltic countries as a ground for its greater exports to the 
rest of EU. 
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Table 10 Recent M&A deals in Europe by Russian companies 
 
 Sector Target Countr
y 
$mln Year 
Amtel Chemicals Vredestein Banden NL 201 2005
Basic Element Metallurgy Hochtief AG DE 525 2007
Evraz Group Metallurgy Vikovice Steel CZ 287 2005
Global Information 
Services Holding 
Machinery Altis Semiconductors FR 449 2007
Lukoil Fuel & Energy Jet Petrol Stations CZ, 
PL, 
HU, FI 
560 2007
Lukoil Energy Nelson Resources UK 2000 2005
Norilsk Nickel Metallurgy OMG nickel assets AU, FI 408 2006
Novolipetsk Steel Metallurgy Duferco US, 
EU 
806 2006
Novolipetsk Steel Metallurgy Steel Invest & Finance 
SA 
LU 805 2006
Renova Energy Energetic source SPA IT 700 2007
Rusal Metallurgy SUAL, Glencore CH 3,60
0 
2007
Rusal Metallurgy Eurallumina SPA IT 420 2006
Severstal Mining (gold) Celtic Resources 
Holdings Plc 
IE 315 2007
Severstal Metallurgy Lucchini SpA IT 579 2005
Severstal Metallurgy Lucchini SpA IT 700 2006
Source: M&A Journal; Thomson Financial 
Note: only stakes above 10% and deals over $100mln included 
 
Russian companies not only acquire assets in Europe, they also use European locations as a 
destination for re-investment to Russia. This is known as the “round tripping” phenomenon, a 
situation when investors channel their local funds abroad with the purpose of subsequent return 
to the domestic economy in the form of foreign direct investment (IMF, 2004: 70; UNCTAD, 
2006: 70). “Round tripping” through Europe and other locations allows Russian companies to 
benefit from investment incentives granted to foreign investors, but more importantly – to hedge 
themselves from any political risks in Russia (which may affect domestic companies). In Europe, 
Cyprus and Luxembourg emerge as offshore locations, through which Russian companies 
perform major investment activities. 
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4.2. Challenges 
 
Lack of mutual investment reciprocity and lack of trust appear to be the biggest challenge in the 
Russia-EU bilateral relations. While the European multinationals complain about the Russian 
state’s strong grip on the economy (and energy sector in particular), similarly, Russian 
companies claim that the access to the EU market and acquisition of assets are often 
constrained due to political considerations.  
Given the controversial history of privatisation in Russia, Europeans may have legitimate 
concerns over the activities of Russian multinationals and acquisition of assets in Europe. While 
the worries about Russian multinationals as tools of Kremlin’s foreign policy may be too much 
politicised, concerns over the current business practices of Russian multinationals may remain 
valid. The concerns perhaps would not be strong if Russian companies were engaged not in 
M&A but in greenfield investment in Europe, thus creating new jobs and generating tax 
revenues for host economies. 
Russian multinationals will have to change these practices sooner or later. As many of them 
seek to attract foreign capital, they have to increase transparency and to adopt international 
business standards and practices; something that Russian companies have been reluctant to do 
so far. Russian multinationals need to introduce more transparency, improve reporting 
procedures, protect minority shareholders rights. It is increasingly acknowledged that long-term 
competitiveness of Russian companies depends on best practices in corporate governance.  
Image of Russian multinationals remains a big problem and obstacle for internationalisation. 
Russian companies have to be more open in communicating to the world. In the present, most 
of them still behave according to “bunker mentality”. The battle for Arcelor in 2005 between 
Mittal Steel and Severstal is a good example. While Mittal launched an offensive PR campaign 
and effectively promoted itself in the media, Severstal remained silent. 
The issue of investment reciprocity comes to the fore. Instead of mutual reciprocity and mutual 
promotion of direct investment, both parties quite often engage in creation of different barriers 
and establishment of mutual restrictions. “Depolitisation” of the issue of foreign investment 
emerges as a way forward in the bilateral relations.  
Presently, Russia restricts foreign investments in energy sector and other important sectors 
such as national defence. These restrictions are stipulated by the Law on Foreign Investments 
in the Strategic Sectors and new amendments to the Law on Subsoil. Likewise, on 19 
September 2007, the European Commission adopted a third package of legislative proposals in 
the domain of EU energy policy. The Commission aims at a wider consumer choice, fairer 
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prices, cleaner energy and security supply. This package strengthened guarantees for EU 
companies of fair competition with third country companies. More specifically, the companies 
from third countries wishing to acquire a significant interest or even control over an EU network 
have to demonstrably and unequivocally comply with the same unbundling requirements as EU 
companies. The European Commission can intervene in situations where a third country 
company fails to do so (EC, 2007). Overall, Europe is not ready to stick to the economic 
liberalism when faced with Russian companies. In May 2008 the EU internal markets 
commissioner Charlie McCreevy called for more openness to foreign investment in Europe and 
argued Europe must “practice the openness we preach” (CNBC, 2008). 
 
4.3. Prospects 
 
A view which is shared by both sides is that a balanced and equitable partnership is needed in 
EU-Russia bilateral relations. A prospective solution is a plan on the table entailing a creation of 
EU-Russia Free Trade Area. The current EU-Russian bilateral relationships are regulated in the 
framework of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), which was signed in 1994 
and entered into force on December 1, 1997. One of its main objectives is the promotion of 
bilateral trade and investment. By the end of 2007 the current PCA came to an end of its initial 
10-year period. Yet, it remains in force unchanged because the both parties have not negotiated 
a new one due to a variety of reasons. 
The energy issues dominate in the bilateral EU-Russia dialogue; and significant prospects for 
EU-Russian bilateral relations lay in this sector. Russian companies seek to buy energy assets 
in Europe to boost their presence (e.g. Gazprom’s intentions to buy Centrica, which owns British 
Gas); and Europeans equally aim at the Russian energy sector. Liberalisation of the EU 
downstream energy market provides enhanced opportunities for Russian multinationals. Yet, 
the proposals being drafted by the EU competition commissioner Neelie Kroes are still in their 
infancy. If adopted, they will enable “unbundled” European energy markets, requiring separate 
energy production and distribution networks, and to integrate 27 national markets in one. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Russian companies emerged recently on the global economy are increasingly catching the 
world headlines.  
Emergence of Russian multinationals has been largely perceived as a threatening development; 
and an argument has been invoked quite often that Russian multinationals are tools of foreign 
policy rather than economic agents. This perception has been a stumbling block on the way of 
academic studies of this phenomenon. 
Our analysis in the paper shows that many Russian companies expanding overseas are in fact 
motivated by economic reasons. Yet, the study of interrelatedness of Russian foreign policy and 
 27
expansion of Russian companies overseas deserves a special attention and should be studied 
within the relevant research area. 
As it has already been stated in the introduction, most Russian companies are reticent 
concerning their economic activities, and in particular, foreign operations (e.g. wide-spread use 
of offshore companies). Obviously, it poses challenges and creates limitations for the academic 
research. With this restricted access to the primary data on the level of particular companies, 
scholars have to deal only with publicly available secondary data on the topic that hide 
significant information. 
As aforementioned, aggregated data on the amount of outward of FDI is a very proxy for 
activities of multinationals. In the paper different sources of data were used to “zoom in” to 
Russian multinational companies themselves. Hence, a logical step and a promising avenue for 
further research is a study of subsidiaries of Russian companies, i.e. to “zoom in” further. 
Recent research on foreign subsidiaries (starting from the seminal paper of Birkinshaw and 
Hood, 1998) has developed tools for such analysis. More specifically, what kind of functions 
these subsidiary possess, what level of competence they have, what is the level of autonomy, 
what is the path of their development and learning over time. 
As shown in the paper, by acquiring foreign assets in western countries, Russian companies 
seek to obtain access to the latest technologies. In this respect, an interest avenue of study is 
how this technology, knowledge and expertise from an acquired firm (i.e. newly established 
subsidiary) is transferred to the headquarters and other units in the corporate network, and what 
kind of tools and mechanisms facilitate this process. 
The global financial crisis ravaging most economies is undeniably affecting Russia’s 
multinational companies too, forcing them to rethink their expansion plans, and invent new ways 
of internationalisation. Yet, Russia’s multinationals are set to play an increasing role in 
European and world business, remaining an exciting research area. 
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Annex 1 
Russian companies in the FORBES Global 2000 list. Year 2008 
 
 Company Industry Sales 
($bn) 
Profits 
($bn) 
Assets 
($bn) 
Market 
Value 
($bn) 
19 Gazprom Oil & Gas 
Operations 
81.76 23.30 201.72 306.79 
108 Lukoil Holding Oil & Gas 
Operations 
54.11 7.69 47.88 62.25 
151 UES of Russia Utilities 34.00 3.17 58.48 47.09 
165 Sberbank Banking 14.75 3.15 131.70 71.88 
170 Rosneft Oil & Gas 
Operations 
21.96 3.63 46.68 77.94 
235 Surgutneftegas Oil & Gas 
Operations 
19.01 2.93 32.65 32.94 
252 TNK-BP 
Holding 
Oil & Gas 
Operations 
22.77 6.58 21.71 27.82 
314 MMC Norilsk 
Nickel 
Materials 11.93 6.19 16.28 51.45 
413 Severstal Materials 12.76 1.21 18.78 26.20 
506 VTB Bank Banking 4.44 1.17 52.31 25.89 
524 Sistema JSFC Telecommunications 
Services 
11.16 0.84 20.06 15.34 
606 Transneft Oil & Gas 
Operations 
7.69 1.96 21.87 8.15 
635 Novolipetsk 
Steel 
Materials 6.21 2.12 8.72 28.77 
652 Tatneft Oil & Gas 
Operations 
8.54 1.13 12.12 13.49 
798 VimpelCom Telecommunications 
Services 
5.00 0.83 8.44 20.35 
835 Magnitogorsk 
Iron & Steel 
Materials 6.60 1.46 5.68 13.18 
1003 Mechel Materials 4.54 0.62 4.61 18.11 
1182 Novatek Oil & Gas 
Operations 
1.85 0.53 3.19 23.08 
1207 Polyus Gold Materials 0.75 1.19 3.64 9.63 
1391 Baltika Brewery Food Drink & 
Tobacco 
3.21 0.57 2.82 7.59 
1402 TMK Materials 3.48 0.45 3.53 7.86 
1508 PIK Group Diversified 
Financials 
1.60 0.31 2.49 13.00 
1531 Slavneft 
Megioneft 
Oil & Gas 
Operations 
4.01 0.81 2.51 3.54 
1555 Moscow 
Municipal Bank 
Banking 1.28 0.21 14.52 6.29 
1586 Avtovaz Consumer Durables 6.77 0.13 6.65 4.90 
1687 Uralkali Chemicals 0.85 0.13 1.26 17.22 
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1867 Bashneft Oil & Gas 
Operations 
3.80 0.44 2.94 2.37 
1891 RosBank Banking 1.42 0.14 11.16 5.10 
 TOTAL 
Russia-28 
 356.25 72.89 764.4 948.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2 
 
Russian companies in global rankings 
 
Company Industry BCG 
100 
Fortune 
500 
Forbes 
2000 
Skolkovo 
Top 25 
Acron Agri-chemical    + 
Alliance Oil Oil & Gas Operations    + 
Alrosa Materials    + 
Avtovaz Consumer Durables   +  
Baltika Brewery Food Drink & Tobacco   +  
Bashneft Oil & Gas Operations   +  
ChTPZ (Arkley Capital) Materials    + 
Eurochem Agri-chemical    + 
Euroset Retails    + 
Evraz Materials    + 
FESCO Transport    + 
GAZ Manufacturing    + 
Gazprom Oil & Gas Operations + + + + 
Lukoil Holding Oil & Gas Operations + + + + 
Magnitogorsk Iron & 
Steel 
Materials   +  
Mechel Materials   + + 
MMC Norilsk Nickel Materials +  + + 
Moscow Municipal 
Bank 
Banking   +  
Novatek Oil & Gas Operations   +  
Novolipetsk Steel Materials   + + 
Novoship Transport    + 
OMZ Manufacturing    + 
PIK Group Diversified Financials   +  
Polyus Gold Materials   +  
PriSco Transport    + 
RAO UES of Russia Utilities / Electricity +  + + 
RosBank Banking   +  
Rosneft Oil & Gas Operations  + +  
Rusal Materials +   + 
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Sberbank Banking   +  
Severstal Materials   + + 
Sistema JSFC Telecommunications 
Services 
  + + 
Slavneft Megioneft Oil & Gas Operations   +  
Sovcomflot Transport    + 
Surgutneftegas Oil & Gas Operations  + +  
Tatneft Oil & Gas Operations   +  
TMK Materials   + + 
TNK-BP Holding Oil & Gas Operations   + + 
Transneft Oil & Gas Operations   +  
Uralkali Chemicals   +  
VimpelCom Telecommunications 
Services 
  + + 
VTB Bank Banking   +  
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